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JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises out of a divorce case and involves questions of alimony, property 
settlements, and an award of attorney fees. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Did Appellant Tony Holmstead properly marshal the facts supporting the trial 
courts decisions in order to attack them on appeal? 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it divided marital property equitably 
rather than apply rigid mathematical formulas without regard to the circumstances 
of the case? 
III. Appellant Tony Holmstead claims as a reasonable monthly expense (which he 
allegedly cannot reduce, prepay, or refinance) a loan payment which allegedly has 
an interest rate over 400%. He therefore asserts he cannot pay alimony or attorney 
fees awarded to his former wife, Sindy Holmstead. Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion when it ordered Tony Holmstead to reduce and refinance this expense 
and calculated alimony and attorneys fees assuming this reduction in expenses? 
IV. Should Petitioner/Appellee be awarded attorneys fees on appeal? 
V. The standard of review in this case is whether the trial court committed an abuse 
of discretion, Shinokoskev v. Shinokoskev, 2001 UT App. 44, If 5, 19 P.3d 1005, 
1007; and correction of clearly erroneous error with regards to finding of facts, 
Elmanv.Elman, 2002 UT App. 83, If 17, 45 P.3d 176, 180; Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 130, f 8, 977 P.2d 1226. Although 
Appellant Tony Holmsteads brief did not show these issues were preserved at the 
trial level, they were preserved with Respondent/Appellants Tony Holmsteads 
post-trial Motion to Alter or Amend Divorce Decree. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Sections 30-3-3 and 30-3-5(7). Both may be found in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This appeal concerns a divorce and property divisions, alimony, and attorney fees 
related to that divorce, but no child support or custody issues. Sindy Holmstead became 
Tony Holmsteads wife on November 27, 1976. The marriage was a long term one of 
thirty years, but eventually Sindy Holmstead filed a Petition for Divorce on January 28, 
2002 in the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County. 
2. While both parties agreed a divorce was necessary, a bench trial was held on 
November 7, 2002 before Judge Paul D. Lyman. This trial allowed Judge Lyman to 
equitably divide the marital property and award alimony and enter his Findings of facts, 
Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce on January 6, 2003, retroactively effective 
on the date of the trial. 
3. After analysis of the parties financial conditions, the trial court awarded Sindy 
Holmstead the family house and her failing business, an amount of monthly alimony, and 
attorneys fees in the amount of $3,500.00. The trial court awarded Tony Holmstead a 
greater amount of his retirement plan as his portion of the marital home. Other awards 
and findings of the trial court (aside from attorney fees) are not at issue in this appeal. 
4. Tony Holmstead filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree of Divorce on January 
10, 2003. An Order denying this motion was entered on January 29, 2003, and is the 
final order in this case and the one appealed from. 
5. Tony Holmstead filed a Notice of Appeal February 24, 2003 from the final order 
denying his Motion to Alter or Amend entered by the trial court. Tony Holmstead is the 
Respondent/Appellant in this case. Sindy Holmstead is the Petitioner/Appellee. 
6. Respondent/Appellant Tony Holmstead is asking this Court to reverse the trial 
court on three aspects of its decision, and remand back to the trial court for correction of 
what he argues is the trial courts abuse of discretion. Specifically, Appellant Tony 
Holmstead argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its division of marital 
property, award of alimony, and award of attorney's fees. 
7. Petitioner/Appellee Sindy Holmstead, the former wife of Appellant Tony 
Holmstead, is asking this Court to sustain the trial court's rulings and award her 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Sindy Holmstead and Tony Holmstead were married for slightly over thirty years. 
(Findings of Fact (hereinafter Find. Fact.), ^ 2). They were divorced on November 7, 
2002 by court decree. Tony and Sindy had three children together, (Trial Tr. 35), all of 
whom had reached majority at the time of the divorce. (Find. Fact, f^ 5). 
Reasons For Divorce 
2. Towards the end of the marriage, Tony Holmstead became addicted to painkillers. 
(Trial Tr. 37-38). This problem became so severe that he underwent unsuccessful 
treatment in a rehab center (Trial Tr. 38). 
3. Tony and Sindy separated about two years before the divorce became final. (Trial 
Jr. 36). The reason for this separation was that Tony Holmstead had been having an 
affair with someone, and Sindy caught him emailing to his girlfriend.Qd; Find. Fact, f 3). 
4. Since their separation, Tony Holmstead had been harassing his wife to such an 
extent that part of the divorce decree involved a restraining order placed on Tony 
Holmstead. (Divorce Decree f^ 2). 
Her Business And The Marital Home 
5. Sindy Holmstead owns a haircutting business, which the trial court found to be of 
no value and awarded to her. (Find. Fact, % 7). The businesses losses clearly exceeded 
the value of any assets. (Id.). She did have $7,559 in her business checking account at 
the time of the divorce, (Find. Fact, f^ 9(d)), but the trial court specifically found that this 
fluctuating amount of money was used for ongoing business expenses such as income 
and social security taxes and supplies. (Id.), 
6. Tony and Sindy owned a marital home with a value of $101,500, after a home 
equity loan had been paid off. (Find. Fact, ^ 6). Each party had $50,750 in equity in the 
home. (Find. Fact. ^  21(a)). 
The Retirement Account 
7. Tony Holmstead had a 401-K account with slightly over $80,000 at the time of 
trial. (Appellants Adden. "H"; Trial Exhibit 28). A loan had been taken on this 401-K 
account, and the 401-K account was owed $19,241.26 on September 30, 2002. (Id.) On 
July 01, 2002 the outstanding balance on the loan was $20,566.78. (Id.) Therefore, in 
about three months time the loan had been paid down by $1,325.52, or by 6.4 % of the 
then total balance of the loan. (Id.). 
8. Tony Holmstead testified at trial that he must make a monthly payment of $618 on 
this loan from the 401-K account. (Trial Tr. 139-140; Appellant Adden. Exhibit "F"). 
However, the trial court felt that the evidence showed the actual required payment 
amount was much less than $618, and more likely $308 per month. (Trial Tr. 217). Tony 
Holmstead testified that he cannot adjust the monthly amount paid each month, and that 
he cannot refinance the loan with another loan from a different source, and that he cannot 
prepay the loan. (Id.). Respondent/Appellant Tony Holmstead testified that if he treated 
the loan as a withdrawal from his 401-K plan then he could face penalties and taxes of 
around 25%. (Trial Tr. 138). 
9. The trial court found that this monthly loan payment of $618 was "clearly 
excessive and unreasonable." (Find. Fact, f^ 26). The court ordered the 
Respondent/Appellant Tony Holmstead to work and reduce the monthly payment, with a 
suggested amount of $120 as being a reasonable expense. (Id.) The trial court awarded 
the marital home to Sindy Holmstead. (Divorce Decree, f 13) Tony Holmstead was 
awarded the first $50,750 of his 401-K as his portion of the home equity, plus an extra 
amount to compensate for assuming the entire amount of the 401-K loan. (Divorce 
Decree, % 14(a)). 
Income, Expenses, And $720 Monthly Alimony To Sindy Holmstead 
10. Petitioner/Appellee Sindy Holmstead has a monthly income $1,100 and monthly 
expenses of $2,092. (Find. Fact. ^  24). The Court further found that she needs at least 
$992 a month extra to maintain the same standard of living as she enjoyed during 
marriage. (Id.). 
11. Respondent/Appellant Tony Holmstead has a monthly income after taxes of 
$3,631. (Find. Fact. *f 26) The learned trial judge found that he had reasonable monthly 
expenses of $2,911, after reducing the 401-K loan payment and disallowing another 
expense, (Find. Fact, f 28). These expenses included payments on over $41,000 of 
separate credit card debt he had amassed since the separation. (Trial Tr. 168) The trial 
court awarded the difference between his income and reasonable expenses as alimony, or 
$720 monthly, which is not enough to meet Sindy Holmsteads needs. (Find. Fact. TJ 28.) 
Appellant Tony Holmsteads Attempts To Avoid Alimony 
12. The trial court specifically found that Tony Holmstead had deliberately 
accumulated at least one significant expense, payments on a new truck, in an attempt to 
avoid paying alimony. (Find. Fact. Iflj 18, 26; Addendum., Denial of Respondents 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment). 
13. The trial court awarded Sindy Holmstead attorney's fees in the amount of $3,500; 
taking into account her prior payment of $1,500 towards the total due of $4,500. (Find. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Tony Holmstead is attempting to reargue in this Court the same 
arguments and evidence that he lost on in the trial court below. He argues that the trial 
courts division of the marital property should be equalized instead of equitable and that 
he does not have the ability to pay alimony and attorneys fees. 
1) Appellant Tony Holmstead Has Failed To Marshal The Evidence 
In order for trial courts findings of fact to be challenged, the challenger must 
marshal the facts supporting the trial courts decision and then show that the trial courts 
reasoning is against the clear weight of the evidence. Tony Holmstead has failed to do 
this on any of the issues on appeal and thus his appeal should be dismissed. 
2) The Trial Court Properly Divided Marital Property Equitably Rather 
Than "Equalize" It. 
Appellant Tony Holmstead argues that all marital property should be divided 
equally rather than equitably, and that the trial court abused its discretion when it was 
equitable rather than equal. Trial courts do not consider property divisions in a vacuum; 
instead they consider other factors such income disparities and the amount of alimony. In 
this case, the trial court properly considered both of these factors in deciding how the 
marital home and retirement plans should be split. 
With regards to Sindy Holmsteads business, "equalizing i f as Tony Holmstead 
desires would be a gross miscarriage of justice. This business is her sole source of 
income, and splitting it with Tony Holmstead would eliminate her income. He would not 
receive significant assets in this exchange. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing her to retain an income. 
3) Tony Holmstead Does Have The Ability To Pay Alimony And Attorneys 
Fees 
Tony Holmstead attacks the awards of alimony and attorney fees against him as an 
abuse of discretion. He specifically attacks one finding of the trial court as improper; 
namely, when it found as excessive and unreasonable a monthly loan payment that he 
makes. He must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion to prevail. 
Using his own arguments are conclusive proof that this payment was indeed 
unreasonable and excessive. His numbers, when extrapolated, show that he is paying 
over 500% interest on this loan, and will repay over $100,000 on a $20,000 loan. The 
trial court ordered him to reduce this payment somehow. There is at least one way to do 
so, even if it is accepted he cannot refinance or in some other way change the amount. 
He could treat the loan as a withdrawal from his retirement. Penalties and taxes will not 
be more than the interest he claims to be paying. Alternatively, if he can refinance the 
loan (as the evidence shows), then he should do so. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by ordering him to reduce this payment amount. 
With regards to attorneys fees, Tony Holmstead again claims that by ordering him 
to reduce the loan payment was an abuse of discretion. This has been discussed. 
Additionally, he argues that after the alimony award is considered, he does not have the 
funds available to pay the minimal attorneys fees awarded. This is simply incorrect, as 
he will receive sufficient funds from the sale of property the court ordered to be sold. 
4) If Appellee Sindy Holmstead Prevails, This Court Should Award Her 
Attorney Fees On Appeal 
Since Sindy Holmstead was awarded attorneys fees below, she asks this Court to 
award her attorneys fees if she prevails on the appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant Tony Holmstead broke up his long term marriage with Sindy Holmstead 
through his infidelity, abusive behavior, and drug addictions. Findings of Fact f^ 3; Trial 
Tr. 37-38. He attempted to improperly accumulate enough debt to avoid paying alimony. 
Findings of Fact fflf 18, 26. When the divorce was granted, the trial court properly 
divided property and assigned alimony and attorneys fees in an equitable fashion. Now, 
Tony Holmstead appeals this equitable decision, as he simply does not want equity to be 
done. With his appeal, he wants to avoid his marital obligations by denying his spouse 
any of his property; bankrupting her sole source of income outside alimony; and 
attempting to reduce his alimony obligations despite making around four times what she 
does. 
I. APPELLANT TONY HOLMSTEAD HAS FAILED TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Appellant Tony Holmstead attacks the trial court on three separate grounds, most 
of which are findings of fact by the learned trial court. In order to challenge a trial courts 
findings of fact, "[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" In re Estate of Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted). 
See also Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 
P.2d 1108,1109 n. 1 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
This marshalling Appellant has completely failed to do. Appellant Tony 
Holmstead has simply recited the findings on point and then highlighted evidence which 
he argues is contrary to the findings of the learned and thorough trial judge. In essence, 
he is rearguing his case in this Court, construing all evidence in his favor and largely 
ignoring the evidence most supportive of the trial courts findings. This Court does "not 
sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts." In re Estate of Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989). As this Court stated in Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996), "We will uphold the trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to 
appropriately marshal all of the evidence." Therefore, Tony Holmsteads appeal fails on 
all issues since he has not marshalled the evidence necessary to challenge the trial courts 
findings. 
II. THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING 
THE UNEQUAL BUT EQUITABLE DIVISION O F MARITAL 
PROPERTY. 
Appellant Tony Holmstead main contention on appeal is that the marital property 
was not divided equally. Appellants Brief, 11-15. In essence, Sindy Holmstead was 
awarded the marital home and a valueless business; while Tony Holmstead was awarded 
a greater portion of his retirement plan as his equity in the home. Divorce Decree, fflf 4, 
13-14. 
A. The 401-K Plan And Marital Home Were Properly 
Divided 
Appellant Tony Holmstead does not argue that he should have received any 
portion of the home; he concedes that it was properly given to Appellee Sindy 
Holmstead. Appellants Brief, 14. Rather, he argues that the trial court either 
miscalculated or abused its discretion, since the retirement amount awarded to him is not 
equal to the value of the house. Id. 
1) The Trial Court Did Not "Miscalculate" 
The trial court clearly did not miscalculate the amounts. This division is precisely 
what the trial court desired. In its Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, the 
trial court explicitly stated that "[t]he Court did not make any 'mathematically incorrect5 
finding or misunderstand the value of the home, the home equity loan, the 5 wheel or 
the 40IK. They are all correctly stated in the Findings and Decree." Addendum, Denial 
of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, 1-2. Since there was no calculation error, 
Appellant Tony Holmstead must show that the trial court abused its discretion in its 
property order. Trial courts are afforded great latitude in determining property divisions; 
and changes will be made in its decisions only if there was a clear abuse of discretion that 
results in a serious inequity. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, If 25, 993 P.2d 
887, 893; Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, If 16, 987 P.2d 603, 609. 
2) Exceptional Circumstances Justify An Unequal Division Of Marital 
Property 
Tony Holmstead argues that all property divisions must be equal, unless there are 
exceptional circumstances detailed by the trial court justifying a different division. Id; 
see Appellants Brief 11-12; see also Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
and Burt v. Burt, 779 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). While these cases do presume 
that marital property should be divided equally, "[t]here is no fixed formula upon which 
to determine a division of properties in a divorce action." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Utah CtApp.1988). 
Although Appellant Tony Holmstead argues that property should be split equally, 
"[t]his presumptive rule of thumb, however, does not supersede the trial court's broad 
equitable power to distribute marital property, regardless of who holds title." Bradford v. 
Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, If 25. A trial court may divide property unequally when the 
circumstances and needs of the parties dictate a different approach. Id. 
Tony Holmstead argues that the trial court made no specific findings detailing any 
exceptional circumstances justifying an unequal but equitable decision. Appellants Brief, 
14. These findings are required by Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and 
Burt v. Burt, 779 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This is incorrect, however, as there 
were findings made by the trial court justifying his equitable division of property. 
3) The Newmeyer Case Mandates Consideration Of Alimony And Income 
Along With Property To Make An Equitable Division 
The facts of the present case on appeal are similar to the facts in Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). In Newmeyer, a long term marriage ended, with 
the wife receiving all of the marital home along with other property. The husband 
challenged this award, alleging he should have received equal value. The court 
disagreed, noting that the husband had much higher income potential and that the 
alimony to the wife was inadequate to support her needs. The court stated: 
In determining whether a certain division of property is equitable, neither 
the trial court nor this Court considers the property division in a vacuum. 
The amount of alimony awarded and the relative earning capabilities of the 
parties are also relevant, because the relative abilities of the spouses to 
support themselves after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable 
determination of the division of the fixed assets of the marriage. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1279 n. 1. Newmeyer is still good law, and its line of reasoning 
is still very much alive. See this Courts discussion at Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 
373,^25. 
4) The Trial Court Considered Alimony And Income Disparities During 
Its Property Division 
This reasoning from Newmeyer is squarely on point in the present appeal. The 
trial court followed Newmeyer by considering the income disparities and alimony needs 
of the parties. The trial court stated: 
The Court equitably divided the assets and liabilities. It did not 'equalize' 
the division of assets.... The Respondent [Tony Holmstead] has the ability 
to earn many times what the Petitioner [Sindy Holmstead] earns, and in 
addition, by awarding the house to the Petitioner, the Court reduced the 
Petitioner's need for alimony. These were both factors in determining how 
to equitably divide the assets and liabilities. 
Addendum, Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, 1. The alimony which Sindy 
Holmstead was not sufficient for her needs. Id at 2. She had a grossly lower income than 
Tony Holmstead, less than half of his even after the alimony award had been factored in. 
(She makes $1,100 monthly plus $720 alimony equals $1,820 monthly income before 
taxes. He had $3,631 monthly income after taxes.) Findings of Fact ffif 24, 26. The 
marriage had been dissolved because of Tony Holmsteads problems; and he had 
attempted to cheat on his expenses for alimony purposes. Id at ^ 3, 18. These findings 
made by the trial judge are detailed and clearly justify the equitable distribution of the 
property, rather than a strict formulaic split. 
These findings clearly are adequate to justify the trial courts property division with 
respect to the house and 401-K plan. Although the property awarded was not necessarily 
equal, it was equitable. This Court should uphold the trial courts equitable division of 
property. 
B. The Business Property Was Properly Awarded To Sindy 
Holmstead 
Tony Holmstead also argues that Sindy Holmsteads business, the "Syndicut," 
should be liquidated and divided between the two of them. Appellants Brief, 15. This 
business was awarded exclusively to Sindy Holmstead, and the trial court found that it 
was worthless. Decree of Divorce, <[ 4; Findings of Fact 1j 7. The trial court strongly 
advised that the business be liquidated (as Appellant Tony Holmstead now desires), but 
did not order it to be liquidated, recognizing that it was a source of income to Sindy 
Holmstead. Id. 
Tony Holmstead challenges the finding of the trial court that the "Syndicut" is 
valueless. Appellants Brief, 14-15. He has failed to marshal the facts. In any case, even 
if his numbers are to be accepted, the business has a top potential value of $9,340. Id. 
He claims that there were unencumbered assets that should be sold and the proceeds 
divided; specifically the cash in the business checking account. Id. 
1) Any Money In The Business Was Used For Expenses 
He fails to realize, or address, the trial courts finding that although there were 
significant sums of money in the business checking account, that money was used for 
ongoing business expenses, such as tax payments and supply payments. Findings of Fact 
K 9(d). If the money in the business checking account were to be divided, then Sindy 
Holmstead would have to take out a line of credit just to maintain her business. Id. Sindy 
Holmstead should not be forced to take operating capital of her business; money that is 
not profit; and give it to Tony Holmstead. She would have to incur substantial debt to 
maintain her business. In effect, Tony Holmstead is asking this Court to force Sindy 
Holmstead to take out a loan and give him all proceeds of the loan free and clear, while 
she must repay the loan. This is clearly inequitable. 
2) If The Business Was "Equalized," Sindy Holmstead Would Lose Her 
Income 
Tony Holmstead further fails to realize that if this business were liquidated, then 
what little income Sindy Holmstead does have would be severely impacted. The evidence 
shows that she only makes $1,100 monthly before alimony. Findings of Fact If 24. The 
majority of this income comes from the "Syndicut." Trial Tr. 53-55. If this business 
were liquidated, then Sindy Holmstead would only have alimony as income, a paltry 
amount of $720 monthly. Tony Holmstead argues that the alimony should be reduced as 
well. See Appellants Brief, 15-19 and discussion, infra, on this argument by Appellant. 
3) Consequences Of "Equalizing" The Business 
Tony Holmstead argues that the property should be "equalized." In order to 
"equalize" the property, this Court would have to: 
1. Strip the sole source of income for Appellee Sindy Holmstead; 
2. Liquidate her business; 
3. Force her to obtain a loan and give the proceeds to Tony Holmstead while remaining 
responsible for the debt; 
4. Once she has done all this, give Tony Holmstead an additional $4,500 maximum, as 
this is his claimed value of the assets he would receive. 
Therefore, for a limited one-time monetary distribution, Tony Holmstead desires this 
Court to grossly increase the burdens on Sindy Holmstead. This is not equitable by any 
stretch of the imagination. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) allows a 
trial court to distribute property equitably, not equally, if income will be dramatically 
affected. This is the case here. The trial court did not abuse its discretion; rather, by 
awarding the "Syndicut" to Sindy Holmstead it did the only thing it could to maintain her 
income, even at her low level. Tony Holmsteads appeal on this issue should be denied. 
III. APPELLANT TONY HOLMSTEAD DOES HAVE THE ABILITY 
To PAY ALIMONY AND ATTORNEY FEES. 
Respondent-Appellant Tony Holmstead argues that he does not have the ability to 
pay the ordered amount of alimony and attorney fees. The trial court awarded Sindy 
Holmstead $720 monthly alimony and $3,500 in attorney fees. Divorce decree ffi[ 19, 22. 
It also explicitly found that Appellant Tony Holmstead had the ability to pay alimony. 
Addendum, Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, 2. Tony Holmstead argues 
that the trial court was clearly erroneous and abused its discretion when it found that he 
had the ability to pay. 
A. Standard for Alimony 
There are three factors a court must consider when setting an alimony award, the 
court must consider first, the needs of the recipient spouse; second, the earning capacity 
of the recipient spouse and third, the ability of the obligor spouse to provide. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(7); Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App. 41,1f6, 974 P.2d 306, 310; Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
If the trial court has considered these factors, then this Court has stated it will 
uphold those findings of fact it will not disturb them without evidence of a clear abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 578 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1994); Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah 1992). Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) also directs that the trial court must be found clearly erroneous in its 
findings of fact before they can be overturned on appeal. 
B. Alimony standard applied 
Appellant Tony Holmstead attacks the trial courts ruling only on the third Rehn 
factor, that of finding the obligors ability to pay alimony. It is clear that the trial court in 
this case made proper and complete findings of fact, with an analysis of the obligors (in 
this case Tony Holmstead) expenses, income, living expenses and debts, as required by 
Rehn and Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Utah Ct.App.1993). The court analyzed all 
parties expenses and incomes. Findings of Fact fflf 24- 29. Therefore, Appellant Tony 
Holmstead must show that these findings were clearly erroneous to be successful in his 
appeal. 
Appellant only attacks one finding as clearly erroneous. This is the disallowance 
by the trial court of his $618 monthly payment on the 401-K loan as unreasonable and 
excessive, along with ordering Tony Holmstead to reduce the amount of the monthly 
payment. Findings of Fact If 26. This argument is another attempt to reduce or eliminate 
his alimony. The trial court specifically and in detail found that Tony Holmstead had 
attempted to increase his expenses in order to reduce the amount of alimony he would be 
obliged to pay. Findings of Fact Tf 18; Addendum, Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, 2. 
1) $618 Monthly Loan Payment Excessive And Unreasonable 
Tony Holmstead alleges that this monthly loan payment expense is entirely 
reasonable and that there was no evidence he could adjust this payment in any fashion at 
all. Appellants Brief, 16-19. He claims that of the $618 monthly payment, $525 is 
interest, leaving only a principal payment of $93 per month. Id. 
The trial court found that this payment was unreasonable and excessive. Findings 
of Fact 126. For Respondent/Appellant Tony Holmstead to prevail, the trial court must 
have clearly erred in describing this payment as unreasonable, and that it could not be 
reduced. The trial courts reasoning is quite clear and reasonable as to why this expense 
was unreasonable and excessive. Id. Rather than restate the learned judges arguments, it 
is instructive to follow Appellant Tony Holmsteads reasoning to its logical conclusions. 
2) This Loan Allegedly Had An Interest Rate Over 500% 
Simply by using Tony Holmsteads own numbers which he urges this Court to 
accept clearly shows that this $618 monthly payment was indeed unreasonable and 
excessive. The learned trial judge was entirely correct in his order to reduce the amount 
paid per month. Taking Tony Holmsteads arguments, he pays $93 monthly in principal. 
Appellants brief, 19. To pay the entire amount due of roughly $19,250 at $93 per month, 
it will take about 207 months, or around 17 years. 
3) This "Reasonable" Loan Requires Repayment Of More Than The 
Entire Amount Of Appellants Retirement 
He claims to be paying $525 monthly in interest. Id. Paying $525 per month for 
207 months means that he expects to pay $ 108,675 in interest before the loan is repaid. 
This means that he expects this Court to believe he has an interest rate of over 500% on 
this loan. ($108,675 divided by $19,250 equals over 500%) By extrapolating his 
numbers, Tony Holmstead is claiming to owe more in interest on this loan than the entire 
value of his 401-K plan (which had a value of around $80,000 at the time of trial). 
Appellants Adden. "H"; Trial Exhibit 28. 
While this calculation seems absurd, as a 500% interest rate is definitely usurious, 
Tony Holmstead seems to argue that we must take this calculation at face value. He 
insists that we take only the evidence introduced at trial, and if it was not introduced into 
evidence then it cannot be considered. Appellants Brief, 16-19. Applying this same rule 
to him, it is clear that the only evidence was that he is paying $93 a month in principal, 
and $525 monthly in interest until the loan is paid in full. It cannot be assumed that these 
numbers ever vary, as no evidence was introduced to that effect. Therefore, it must be 
assumed that he indeed is paying 500% total interest and will repay more in interest than 
the entire value of his retirement. 
4) Even One Years Worth Of Payments Are Unreasonable 
Even if his numbers are analyzed for just one year, it must be concluded that the 
loan payment is excessive and unreasonable. Following his numbers, it is clear he has 
paid $4725 in interest from the date of the trial, November 2002, until August 2003 (9 
months multiplied by $525). He therefore has paid about 25% total interest on the loan in 
about 3/4ths of a year ($4725 divided by $19,250 equals around 25%). In fact, he pays a 
little less than 3% total interest on the loan amount per month, and around 33% interest a 
year ($525 divided by $19,250 is a little less than 3%, and $525 multiplied by 12 months 
and then divided by $19,250 is just about 33%). A yearly interest rate of 33% is also 
excessive. 
5) Appellants Allege This Extreme Payment Amount Cannot Be Changed 
Regardless of whether this loan payment could be considered reasonable, 
however, Tony Holmstead argues that the evidence shows that he can do nothing about it. 
Appellants Brief, 17, 19. He claims he cannot prepay the loan; that he cannot refinance 
the loan, or borrow money elsewhere and pay off the loan, or adjust the monthly amount 
due. Id. By ordering him to reduce this $618 monthly amount, he claims the trial court 
abused its discretion, when he could not change the amount paid every month. His 
central argument is that the order to reduce his payment is impossible and cannot be 
done, and therefore this order was an abuse of discretion. 
6) Appellant Can Reduce The Payment By Treating The Loan As A 
Withdrawal From The 401-K At Much Lower Penalties And Taxes 
Even if Tony Holmstead cannot change the loan terms, the evidence does show 
that there is one way he could reduce the payment. He could treat the loan as a 
withdrawal from his retirement. This option was discussed during testimony. See 
Appellant Brief Adden. "F", Trial Trans. 137-38. Tony Holmstead testified he did not 
wish to take this option, as severe penalties and taxes are assessed against someone who 
takes an early withdrawal from their 401-K plan. The testimony was that the penalties 
and taxes would be "huge. Over 25 percent." Id. If this is true, it would still be advisable 
to treat the loan as a withdrawal, as the penalties and taxes would be much less than the 
interest due on this loan, if Tony Holmsteads numbers are used as he urges . A twenty-
five percent penalty is much less than paying 500% interest. 
By treating the loan as an early withdrawal from his retirement plan, he could still 
comply with the trial courts order. Doing so would be a better deal for him financially, as 
he would still save significant amounts of interest, even if he pays the taxes and penalties. 
The trial court did not abuse his discretion in his order to reduce this payment, as there 
was at least this one way to reduce this amount entered into testimony. 
7) This Usurious Loan Could Be Nullified By Court Order 
Even if the evidence did show that there was absolutely no way Tony Holmstead 
could reduce this unreasonable loan payment, then the trial court still did not abuse its 
discretion. When Tony Holmsteads own numbers are used, he should still be ordered to 
reduce the loan payment, as the loan payment is clearly unreasonable and excessive. If 
the loan is really that usurious (as using Tony Holmsteads own arguments on appeal 
suggest), then it is likely illegal as a matter of law. The appropriate remedy would be for 
the Appellant Tony Holmstead to apply for a court order to nullify or change the loan 
payment and terms, rather than have his divorce decree modified. 
8) Clearly The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Ordering This 
Loan Payment Reduced 
It is absurd that any rational man would agree to a 500% interest rate on a loan. Yet, 
Appellant Tony Holmstead insists that he cannot change his payment and is forced to pay 
it. He agreed to this loan. Sindy Holmstead should not have her alimony reduced to pay 
for his absurd loan agreements. It would be contrary to public policy to allow an alimony 
award to be subject to such a patently unfair loan. If Tony Holmstead agreed to this loan, 
then he and he alone should bear its costs. He obviously can afford to pay alimony if he 
is paying on a loan with terms so absurd as this one. 
9) The Real Interest Being Paid Is Far Less Than $525 Monthly 
Using Tony Holmsteads numbers, as he insists, clearly leads to unreasonable 
results. If it is assumed that he absolutely cannot be paying that much in interest, then it 
is obvious that $525 of his $618 monthly payment is not all interest. This is most likely 
true, as an examination of the 401-K loan statement introduced into evidence shows. 
Appellants Brief, Adden. Exhibit "H" and Trial Exhib. 28. Although page 2 of the 
statement shows $525 paid in interest, the statement itself covers three months: from July 
1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. Thus, this interest must be divided by three to see the 
actual amount of interest paid, or $175 monthly. This means that instead of only $93 
monthly being paid on principal, $443 is being paid. ($618-$ 175 equals $443). 
10) Paying $618 Would Completely Retire The Loan Within Three Years 
A payment of $618 per month could pay the entire loan off in less than three 
years. $618 multiplied by 12 months equals $7,416 paid on this loan per year. 
Multiplied by three years, he will have paid $22,248 in that time span, which is $2,998 
greater than the amount owed. He could have an interest rate of up to 15% on this loan 
and still completely pay off the loan in three years by paying $618 monthly. ($2,998 
excess payment divided by total due of $19,250 is 15%). 
11) The Trial Court Believed That The Actual Payment Was Only $308 
Monthly 
The court believed that the actual monthly payment amount required on this loan 
was $308, not $618. Findings of Factf 26; Trial Tr. 217. See also Appellants Brief 
Adden. Exhibit "H;" Trial Exhibit 28. Tony Holmstead has not demonstrated that it is 
not. A payment of $618 when $308 is all that was required is clearly excessive, and the 
Court so found and ordered Tony Holmstead to reduce the payment. Additionally, if 
Tony Holmstead was overpaying by such a large amount, then clearly there is no penalty 
to prepay, and there is no reason this loan could not be refinanced as the trial court 
suggests. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
It is clear that far from being clearly erroneous, the trial courts findings that the 
loan payment is excessive and unreasonable was entirely correct. There was testimony 
that there was at least one way the loan payment could be reduced, even if Tony 
Holmsteads arguments and numbers are accepted. If his numbers are not accepted, then 
it is clear that he was substantially prepaying on the loan without penalty, and therefore 
can follow the courts order and reduce the payment amount through refinancing the loan. 
Appellant Tony Holmstead has simply failed to show how the trial courts findings and 
order were clearly incorrect and against the clear weight of the evidence, as he must do to 
show that the trial judge clearly abused its discretion. 
12) Order Made Bankruptcy Proof To Insure Appellant Would Pay 
Alimony 
Appellant Tony Holmsteads other basis for attack on the trial judges findings and 
order are equally implausible. Tony Holmstead argues that the trial court was so 
concerned with Tony Holmsteads ability to pay that he made the order bankruptcy proof. 
Appellants Brief, 17; Findings of Fact f 22. Appellant is simply mistaken. The trial 
court knew that Tony Holmstead had attempted to game the alimony award with 
unreasonable expenses. Findings of Fact Tf26. The record is clear that the order was 
made bankruptcy proof so that Appellant Tony Holmstead would not attempt to declare 
bankruptcy and thus end his obligations under the divorce decree. Trans. 216-217. 
Additionally, Appellant Tony Holmstead argues that the trial court improperly 
relied on Tony Holmsteads closing arguments. In essence, counsel for Tony Holmstead 
suggested potential payment plans for Appellee Sindy Holmstead, which theory the court 
then applied to Tony Holmstead. Appellant Tony Holmstead claims that this action by 
the trial court was improper, yet cites no legal authority to prove his point. The court 
used a line of reasoning suggested by counsel and applied it to the party suggesting it— 
much like party admissions may be used against them. See, e.g. Utah Rul. Evid. 
801(d)(2). Since Appellant cites no legal authority for this point, it should be dismissed. 
Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998). 
Attacking this finding and order was the only way in which Appellant Tony 
Holmstead attempted to show that he did not have the ability to pay alimony. As the 
preceding discussion shows, his attack fails. The trial courts finding that Tony 
Holmstead did have the ability to pay alimony must stand. Therefore, the amount of 
alimony ordered is also correct, and Respondent/Appellant Tony Holmsteads appeal of 
this issue should be denied. 
C. The Standard For Attorneys Fees 
A trial court may award attorneys fees in divorce cases. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3. 
For a court to award attorneys fees, substantially the same factors as an award of alimony 
must be found. The reasonableness of the desired fees, the need for them to be awarded, 
and the ability of the other spouse to pay must be considered. Shinokoskey v. 
Shinokoskev, 2001 UT App. 44, ^  18, 19 P.3d 1005, 1010-11. 
1) Appellant Tony Holmstead Ordered To Pay Minimal Attorneys Fees 
Appellant Tony Holmstead was ordered to pay $3,500 towards Appellee Sindy 
Holmsteads total attorney fees of $4,500. Findings of Fact ^ f 32, Decree of Divorce ^ f 22. 
Tony Holmstead appeals this award on the same grounds as he did the alimony award; 
namely that he does not have the ability to pay attorney's fees. Appellants Brief, 20. 
Setting aside the self-evident fact that he obviously can pay his own attorney 
enough for an appeal, Appellant Tony Holmsteads appeal of this issue should be 
dismissed as well. He has again failed to marshal the facts. He simply does not marshal 
any evidence where he might have the ability to pay and then try to distinguish it. 
2) Order To Reduce $618 Monthly Loan Payment Reasonable 
Tony Holmstead advances two theories to show he does not have the ability to 
pay. Id. He first claims that the trial courts order to reduce the $618 monthly loan 
expense was unreasonable, as well as another expense the court disallowed (which 
disallowance is not questioned). Id. These objections have been already dealt with in the 
preceding discussion on alimony. 
Appellants second objection is that after his expenses and alimony payments are 
taken into account, he has no surplus income with which to pay attorneys fees. Id. This is 
untrue. Clearly, Tony Holmsteads income is far greater than Sindy Holmsteads. 
Findings of Fact •fl 32. He will be able to recover quicker from the divorce. He has 
expenses which he could temporarily cut back on, if necessary. These could include 
entertainment and incidental gifts, etc. See Appellants Brief, Exhibit "E", Trial Exhibit 
18: Affidavit of Monthly Expenses. The testimony was that some of his reasonable 
expenses were incurred on behalf of his girlfriend; who was the main reason the marriage 
dissolved. See Findings of Fact ^ f 3; Trial Trans. 170. 
3) Appellant Does Have Money To Pay Attorneys Fees 
Tony Holmstead does have the current income to pay Appellee's attorney fees in 
the amount awarded. The trial court ordered a mountain home or lot sold, and it was 
stipulated that the proceeds would be split. Decree of Divorce, Tf 20. The property was 
stipulated to be worth at least $25,000 and Appellant Tony Holmstead will receive at 
least half, or $12,500. Id; Trial Trans. 9. When this lot sells, if it has not already, it will 
be more than enough to pay Sindy Holmsteads attorneys fees, plus any awarded to her on 
appeal. 
4) Appellant Tony Holmstead Once Again Is Retrying The Case On 
Appeal 
Appellant Tony Holmstead claims once again that he does not have the ability to 
pay an award of the court. He again has failed to marshal the facts supporting the trial 
courts decision. He ignores any facts supporting the trial court. In essence, he is 
rearguing the same issues as he did below, hoping for a different result in this Court. His 
attack on the trial courts award of attorneys fees should be denied, as he simply has failed 
to show how the court abused its discretion. 
IV. APPELLEE SINDY HOLMSTEAD SHOULD RECEIVE HER 
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL 
Appellee Sindy Holmstead asks this Court to award her the attorney's fees she has 
incurred in response to this appeal. This award is proper if she prevails on the 
substantive merits of this case, as she was awarded attorney fees below. "Generally, when 
fees in a divorce case are awarded to the prevailing party at the trial court, and that party 
in turn prevails on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on appeal." Shinokoskey v. 
Shinokoskey, 2001 UT App. 44, f 20, 19 P.3d 1005, 1011 (quoting Marshall v. Marshall. 
915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct.App.1996)). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the trial courts well-reasoned rulings and findings. 
Appellant Tony Holmstead has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion on 
any count. He has failed to marshal the facts when attacking the trial courts findings. He 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not "equalizing" the property division. 
The trial court, knowing that property divisions are not made in a vacuum, properly 
considered the income disparities and alimony awards of the parties in its division of 
marital property and should be upheld. 
Tony Holmstead argues that he should be granted part of Appellee Sindy 
Holmstead's business. He fails to realize that if the Court granted him part of this 
business, it would eliminate her income, as small as it already is. It would be a gross 
miscarriage of justice to strip the Appellee of her income in the name of "equality." 
Tony Holmstead argues he does not have the ability to pay the alimony and 
attorneys fees awarded to Sindy Holmstead by the trial court. He attacks the propriety of 
the trial courts finding as an unreasonable and excessive expense a monthly loan payment 
and ordering him to reduce it. Using Appellant Tony Holmsteads own numbers clearly 
show that this payment was excessive and unreasonable to the point of absurdity. 
Alternatively, by looking at the actual evidence, it is clear that the payment could 
be reduced, it was still unreasonable and excessive, and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering Tony Holmstead to reduce it. The evidence clearly shows that 
Appellant Tony Holmstead had the ability and funds to pay the small attorney's fees as 
well, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ordering him to pay 
attorneys fee. 
Appellee Sindy Holmstead asks for an award of her attorneys fees incurred on 
appeal, as she was awarded them below and it is clear that Tony Holmstead has failed to 
show an abuse of discretion by the trial court below. His appeal should be dismissed on 
all counts and the trial courts well-reasoned findings and order should be upheld. 
Dated this 2nd day of September, 2003 
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SINDYHOLMSTEAD, 
Plaintiff, 
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TONYD.HOLMSTEAD, 
Defendant. 
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DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 024600016 
Assigned Judge: Paul D. lyman 
The Court has reviewed the Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, the 
Petitioner's Objection to motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, and the Court's ruling issued on 
November 7,2002. Based upon the foregoing review the Court enters the following: 
The Court equitably divided the assets and liabilities. It did not "equalize" the division of 
assets. The Findings and Decree as signed accurately reflect the Court's equitable division of the 
parties' assets and liabilities. The Respondent has the ability to earn many times what the 
Petitioner earns, and in addition, by awarding die house to die Petitioner, the Court reduced the 
Petitioner's need for alimony. These were both factors in determining how to equitably divide 
the assets and liabilities. 
The Court did not make any "mathematically incorrect" finding or misunderstand the 
value of the home, the home equity loan, the 5th wheel or the 401K. They are all correctly stated 
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT, Case 
number 024600016, Page -2- _ _ 
in the Findings and Decree. 
The Respondent asks the Court to reduce the amount of alimony, which is already not 
sufficient to meet the needs of the Petitioner. In the Respondent's motion he ignores that the 
Court has found that he took on a $743.00 per month truck obligation in an attempt to avoid 
paving alimony. The Respondent needs to sell that truck. In addition, the Court used the 
Respondent's own suggested payment plan on another debt, to come up with the $ 120.00 per 
month payment on his 401K loan, instead of the $618.00 per month he is currently paying. The 
alimony award is reasonable and the Petitioner has sufficient ability to pay it, if he so chooses. If 
he does not, then he may be found in contempt. 
The Court did look at the appropriate factors in determining that the Respondent should 
pay a portion of the Petitioner's fees. Her need is well established through the disparate earning 
abilities. 
The Court specifically found that the business5 losses exceed the value of its assets. The 
losing business and its assets were awarded to the Petitioner. 
Consequently, the Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied. 
Dated this £ ^ d a y of January, 2003. 
''Wi 
PAUL D. LYMAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUD 
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT, Case 
number 024600016, Page -3-
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ADDENDUM II. STATUTORY SECTIONS RELIED ON 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 Award of costs, attorney and witness fees -Temporary 
alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an 
order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to 
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in 
its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, 
during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be 
amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7) 
